The State Of The New York Mets
This Mets season has been a disaster. I wonât bother emphasizing on this, because many, many articles and websites have already been written and made discussing this. The Mets are awful. They are not a good baseball team. They are dead last in Major League Baseball, Lindor is hurt until June. Thereâs no light at the end of the tunnel here. They built a horrible, injury-prone team and theyâre playing like a horrible, injury-prone team. The doomer part of my brain desperately wants to just call my favorite sports team ever as âcursedâ. This is not the case. The Mets have ended up in this pit by their own hand, not through some level of bad luck or LOLMETS.
I want to present my analysis of the New York Mets as an organization, because I find it healthier than the alternative, just staring down the barrel of another dead season. This is my deep dive into the state of the New York Mets. Iâll be jumping around a lot here. This analysis will not be linear, because this downfall has not been linear. What matters is that it ends with the Mets here, in the pit.
I will be tailoring my usage of specific metrics based on the roles that players are playing on this team. For example, I donât care much about the WAR totals of relievers as much as I care about their rate-based stats. FIP/xFIP will be the primary rate-base stats for pitchers and wRC+ will be the primary rate-based stat used for hitters, with WAR being used selectively for hitters and starting pitchers. Much more analytical context will be given for specific players, but I just wanted to provide a brief primer here so you know what to expect.
Letâs answer the question: how did we end up here, at the bottom, again? I will evaluate all the major decisions that put together this current Mets team, grading them and discussing how the Mets should proceed from this point forward. Iâll be ranking these decisions from worst to best, with the best at the end. The ranking is contingent on the process behind the decision and how I evaluate the decision AT THE TIME, trying to avoid revisionist history and retconning.
Without further adieu, in search of catharsis, letâs find out how the Mets built one of the worst teams money can buy.
Extending Sean Manaea
Coming off a career year in 2024, the Mets chose to extend Manaea through 2027, bringing his contract to a 75m/3yr deal. This contract extension was really bad at the time and looks even worse in hindsight. Manaea is not a rotation-caliber pitcher right now and barely an MLB caliber pitcher. His stuff grades have plummeted and his metrics follow suit, with a 4.44 FIP and 4.56 xFIP through 2026. Even worse has been his availability. Manaea was injured throughout 2025, pitching only 60.2 innings, and has been injured through 2026 as well. Manaeaâs fastball velocity (vFA) has dropped consistently each year since 2023, now down to a lowly 90.2mph.
What frustrates me most about this decision is how blatantly bad this decision was in the moment. The Mets extended Manaea as an emotional response to the epic highs of the 2024 season. When you look into his profile pre-2024, itâs easy to see the yellow and red flags screaming at you from the bleachers, saying, âDo NOT extend this guy!â. The Mets did it anyway.
Manaea was 32 years old in 2024, and the Mets chose to extend him through 2027, paying him top dollar to be a starting pitcher through his age 35 season. Every single aging curve on the planet could tell you that the WAR production of MLB players falls off significantly after age 30. Manaea has never been an elite front-end pitcher, as even in his âbreakoutâ 2024 campaign, his underlying xFIP was a 4.04 - not awful, but not the kind of guy you want to be paying 20m+ annually.
Manaea profiled as an innings eater, which is the role heâs served faithfully his entire career, and the Mets paid him like a front-end starter. Manaeaâs vFA had ALREADY DECLINED from 2023 to 2024 from 93.6 to 92.2mph, he was on the wrong side of 30, and the Mets paid him like he had found the fountain of youth. Manaea was injured in 2019/2020, Manaea was used primarily as a RELIEVER by the San Francisco Giants in 2023, and the Mets overpaid for an extension off of a career year by 32 year old Sean Manaea.
The worst part about this contract is that itâs not over until next year, and itâs basically immovable. The Mets would have to eat the entire contract to make ANYTHING happen, and for what? No rational team is going to give up anything of value for the current Sean Manaea, who might not be a positive WAR MLB player at this point in his career. Every single thing in his profile is down, heâs 34 years old, and heâs under contract through 2026 and 2027. This isnât a Verlander/Scherzer situation where you can eat an enormous contract to get prospects back, because Sean Manaea has, essentially, 0 value. The Mets paid 75 million dollars for Manaea, and not even a full 2 years later, have seen the asset theyâve invested depreciate into nothingness, possibly worse than nothingness.
This, to me, is one of the worst decisions of Stearnsâ tenure because of the indicators that existed prior to the extension. This isnât just a bad contract, this isnât just bad results, this is bad process. The Mets took a beautiful decision (signing Manaea to a 1yr, $12m deal prior to 2024 and having him blossom into a rotation anchor amidst a deep playoff run) and turned it into something ugly due to pure emotional decision making.
What do we do now?
Eat the contract. Thereâs nothing else you can do. If we get really lucky, maybe we can eat Manaeaâs entire contract for a flier prospect, maybe we can swap him for a slightly better player on an equally bad contract, maybe we can trade him for a more expensive contract that expires this year instead of next year. Regardless of what they do from here, the damage is done.
Signing Jorge Polanco Over Munetaka Murakami
Jorge Polanco was a free agent this past offseason. Polanco, prior to this offseason, was a frequently injured player who was a negative defender at every position on the diamond, and offset that with a good bat. Following a successful 2025 campaign, where he put up 2.6 WAR and a career-high 132 wRC+, the Mets signed Polanco to a 2 year, $40 million dollar contract ($20m AAV).
This is, again, bad process. Polanco has recorded 2+ WAR only 3 times in his entire career - 2019, 2021, and 2025. I get a sense of deja vu from this extension, because of the similarities to the Manaea extension - Polanco was 32 years old at the time of signing, put up a career year after gradually declining batting seasons since 2021 (124 wrC+ in 2021, 118 in 2022, 116 in 2023, and 93 in 2024). The Mets overpaid for a player with no real defensive home (and who has had declining defensive value since 2020!), who has struggled significantly with injuries throughout his career, and whoâs age and overall wRC+ trendline point to a player in decline. Polanco is a one tool player and that tool is depreciating every year. The Mets gave him $20m annually through 2027, where heâll be 34 years old.
What makes this deal even worse is the context surrounding it. The White Sox signed 25 year old Japanese free agent Munetaka Murakami to a 2 year, $17m deal. While I donât think itâs fair to compare their 2026 seasons thus far due to the extremely small sample size, Iâll indulge the concept for a moment. Polanco was injured practically as soon as the season began and is currently on the injured list, with a 52 wRC+ and -0.3 WAR. Murakami has been red-hot to start the season, recording a 154 wRC+ and 1.2 WAR thus far.
I donât think this is a fair way to evaluate the context surrounding this signing. What I DO think is a fair way to evaluate this signing is rooted in my evaluation of Murakami as a free agent compared to Polanco.
Munetaka Murakami has raked through the NPB his entire career and is 26 years old. Murakami has titanic power (80 grade on FanGraphs!). There were two real knocks on Murakamiâs profile - his issues with velocity and his defense. The velocity issues never really concerned me, partly because of the differences between the NPB ball and the MLB ball and partly because of the success of other overseas hitters who have made the transition to the MLB (Masataka Yoshida, Jung Hoo Lee, etc.). The defense is a non-issue because Murakami was never a DISASTEROUS defender, heâs just relegated to being a first baseman or designated hitter, which is the EXACT ROLE the Mets signed Polanco to play. Murakami has actually been a better defender than Polanco this year, which is kind of funny.
The results donât matter so far in 2026. Okay, they matter a little bit to me, but letâs ignore it entirely for the sake of criticizing the Mets process here. The Mets had to fill the hole left by losing Alonso at the 1B/DH position, and chose a 32 year old, often injured, steadily declining hitter coming off a career year over a 26 year old overseas superstar with 80 grade power coming off a career year. Not only did the Mets make this decision, they paid an extra $6m to make this decision, and got outmaneuvered by the White Sox of all teams in the process.
Independent of what happens the rest of this season (Murakami will be better) or the rest of their contracts (Murakami will be better), this is a horrible decision that the Mets paid extra for the privilege of making.
We Canât Develop Hitting Prospects
This is probably the most important issue to me as a Mets fan. The Mets are completely incapable of developing both the floor and the ceiling of their hitting prospects. Anyone with knowledge of roster construction will tell you that the key to sustained success as a MLB franchise is consistently churning out hitting prospects that contribute at the major league level while on pre-arbitration/arbitration contacts. Anyone with knowledge of roster construction will tell you that the cheapest way to get a superstar is to grow them yourself. Anyone with knowledge of roster construction will tell you about how valuable blue-chip prospects are.
In short, my point is this - good franchises get value out of arbitration. Good franchises develop superstars and buy out their arbitration years for a discount on their free agent years. Good franchises find roles for the hitters in their farm system. The Mets are not just a failure in this area, they are a depleted wasteland.
Here is a list of homegrown prearb/arbitration hitters on the Mets, their age, and their associated wRC+/average yearly WAR throughout full MLB seasons theyâve played, along with their peak WAR across an entire season. Keep in mind when looking at this list that 2 WAR tends to be the threshold for a starting caliber/solid MLB player.
Francisco Alvarez - 24 y/o, 105 avgwRC+, 2.2 avgWAR (3.0 peak, 2023)
Mark Vientos - 26 y/o, 102 avgwRC+, 0.8 avgWAR (2.9 peak, 2024)
Brett Baty - 26 y/o, 86 avgwRC+, 0.8 avgWAR (2.3 peak, 2025)
Ronny Mauricio - 25 y/o, has been so bad at MLB level that he hasnât accumulated a large enough sample size to put here
Carson Benge - 23 y/o, too early to judge
Thatâs the entire list. Francisco Alvarez is a solid, starting caliber MLB catcher. Vientos and Baty had one year where they provided solid/starting caliber value and have been downright trash outside of those seasons (which is an issue on its own⊠why canât the Mets sustain the success that their young hitters flash?). At this point in 2026, it looks like Vientos is maybe a bench bat or corner infield platoon bat who starts against LHP, and Baty is maybe a superutility platoon bat who starts against RHP. In other words, both of these guys look like theyâre destined for bench roles. Mauricio is basically unplayable at the MLB level, still, at age 25. I wonât write much about Benge in this article because heâs extremely young and this isnât a fair sample size to judge him on.
The point that Iâm making is this - the Mets have turned the best hitting prospects in their organization over the past 5 years into one potential starting caliber player (Alvarez), two bench pieces, and what looks like a true bust in Mauricio. This is both a quantity and a quality issue. The Mets donât have the amount of hitting prospects other teams do. The Mets donât have the caliber of hitting prospects other teams do. The Mets, consistently, have failed to develop and capitalize on breakout seasons from their hitting prospects like other teams do. The Mets are incapable of developing both the floor and the ceiling of their hitting prospects.
This is, somehow, simultaneously, an issue with roster construction at the Major League level. Baty provided the bulk of his value as a defensive third baseman in 2024/2025, yet the Mets chose to sign Bo Bichette to play 3B out of position, sending Baty into superutility limbo at positions where he is less valuable. Vientos provides the bulk of his value through his bat against LHP, yet the Mets chose to sign Jorge Polanco to play 1B/DH, limiting the amount of at-bats that Vientos can get in situations that maximize his value.
This cannot simply be an issue with the individual players. There is something deeper at work here that is leading to the Mets being seemingly incapable of developing players who are productive at the MLB level while on pre-arbitration/arbitration contracts.
Any organization that fails to develop any pre-arb/arbitration players into productive MLB players is not a sustainable organization, no matter how much money you throw at it. Look at teams with similar payrolls to the Mets! The Yankees have turned Austin Wells and Ben Rice into very valuable players on prearb contracts and are getting productive roles out of players like Anthony Volpe (regardless of him disappointing relative to expectations) and Oswaldo Cabrera. The Dodgers are getting significant value out of Andy Pages and have Dalton Rushing in a contributing role. These are teams that spend as much as the Mets and are as reliant on free agent acquisitions as the Mets, yet theyâre completely outproducing the Mets in terms of players on pre-arbitration/arbitration contracts. This is an objective failure on the Mets developmental system.
Please Develop These Hitting Prospects
Iâm going to take a brief break from the negativity showcased thus far in the article and talk about something I feel could be a glimmer of hope for the Mets. There are actual hitting prospects in the Mets system that could be good. Iâve outlined above why thereâs significant reason for Mets fans to doubt that they WILL be developed into productive players at the MLB level, but in terms of prospect pedigree as hitters, there is talent in the system.
Iâd like to start this section off by discussing one of the few bright spots in David Stearnsâ 2025-26 offseason. The Yankees had an agreement with #1 ranked international free agent SS Wandy Asigen, which fell through due to a bunch of weirdness, after which the Mets swooped in and signed Asigen, flipping the #1 IFA prospect to the Mets organization.
Wandy Asigen is a really good prospect, practically as good of a prospect as a 16 year old can be. Per FanGraphs, âAsigenâs talent is consistent with that of a high school player whoâd feel like a good bet to be selected within the top five picks of a draft, a lefty-hitting, long-term shortstop with exciting physical projection. His low-ball power and bat speed give him rare ceiling, the potential to be a 25-homer weapon who also plays a good shortstopâ. Asigen is graded at a 45+ FV has three projected plus tools already at just age 16: 60 grade power, 55 speed, 55 field. Other prospect websites are more aggressive about grading Asigen higher, Iâm choosing to use FanGraphs here because they tend to be (often appropriately) bearish on prospect grades. Asigenâs hit tool is a bit weak at this point, but regardless, FanGraphs concludes his profile stating, âThe hit tool piece of his profile has a little more risk than is typical for a prospect graded this aggressively at this age, but Asigen has overt big league physicality and infield athleticism, and he wonât turn 17 until late August. He has a wide range of potential outcomes â everything from strikeout-prone bust to five-tool shortstop, and the slugging 2B/3B outcomes in between â but a lot of them are really excitingâ. Asigen has real potential, with a floor as a contributor and a ceiling as a superstar.
International free agency has actually been a bright spot for Stearns throughout his Mets tenure. In 2025, the Mets signed SS Elian Peña, a similarly highly graded (albeit a bit less highly than Asigen) international amateur prospect, who has done extremely well in the Mets system so far, with a 146 wRC+ at the DSL level in 2025 and a 165 wRC+ in A-ball in 2026. Peña grades out at a 45 FV, but features a solid 50 hit tool and two potential plus tools: 55 power, 55 field, with his negative tool being 30 speed. Regardless, Peña looks like a player who will contribute to the Mets at some point.
The rest of the hitting prospects in the Mets system are domestic prospects, acquired via the draft, some with some real promise. The highest graded on FanGraphs is 3B Jacob Reimer, who has raked his way through the MiLB so far and features a plus hit tool at 55 and solid power at 50. Ryan Clifford, AJ Ewing, and Eli Serrano III are all interesting prospects. Iâm not personally a big fan of Mitch Voit, who the Mets drafted last year, as I feel he profiles as a AAAA player rather than a player with true big league upside (hoping Iâm wrong!).
That is, shockingly, about it. The Mets system is heavily slanted towards pitching and doesnât feature a lot of, if any (depending on how you feel about Asigen/Reimer), blue chip bats. If youâre prognosticating for a lower ranked prospect to break out in a big way, I guess youâre hoping on players like Boston Baro, Randy Guzman, Antonio Jimenez, Marco Vargas, Yovanny Rodriguez, Heriberto Rincon, Colin Houck, Ronald Hernandez, or (by far the most interesting to me at this point), recently signed IFAs Cleiner Ramirez/Edward Lantigua, but none of the guys I just mentioned are anywhere close to projectable at this point as major league contributors, and the Mets track record of developing hitting talent makes me think that they wonât get there either.
The prospect issue is really best seen in a guy like Carlos Cortes, who struggled through the Mets system for 7 years before being signed as a MiLB free agent by the Athletics, who then proceeded to instantly turn him into a plus bat and MLB-level contributor. Iâm not sure whatâs going on with the Mets hitting development exactly, but somewhere in the path to the big leagues for these prospects, theyâre getting tied up - either from the jump to the minors to the major league level, in a lack of ability to capitalize on big league success, or at lower levels in the minors, the Mets have a black hole where a steady supply of MLB contributors should be. The issue isnât that the Mets are failing to develop superstars, something much easier said than done, the issue is that the Mets are failing to develop a floor for their hitting prospects to at least produce at a MLB level. The Mets are seemingly incapable of identifying roles that would reap value for their young players, and when they do find these roles, theyâre either incapable or unwilling to develop these roles further to create value.
Pitching Development
This section is going to be a lot less brief than the last, because the Mets actually have had success in this area, namely through Nolan McLean, who is by far the most valuable asset on this Mets roster as a pre-arbitration ace. I could complain about the fact that he hasnât be extended yet, but I hope the Mets decision-makers are savvy enough to recognize the type of player McLean is. I could complain about the lack of pre-arbitration/arbitration relievers and spot starter options, with the only real example being David Peterson, but theyâve done well enough to avoid scorn in this area.
The one note I want to make here is on Jonah Tong. Tong is a lights-out pitcher who shoved through the minors and was decent in the MLB. Tongâs problem is that he needs to add another solid or plus pitch to his arsenal, which sounds easy, but could prove to be difficult - monitor his development closely going forward. There is nothing more valuable in baseball than young, controllable starting pitching, and if the Mets can stamp the developmental success label on both McLean and Tong as front/mid rotation pitchers, it would be a huge step forward for the organizationâs future.
Scott and Wenninger are both solid pitchers who absolutely need to have a role identified for them on the major league roster that they can be productive in. I believe that Scott profiles more as a reliever due to his injury history and Wenninger might as well, but weâll have to see.
Kodai Senga
The Senga contract is bad, but I think that thereâs a way forward for Senga to at least provide contributing value on the Major League roster. Senga could hypothetically be developed in the mold of a Fernando Cruz type reliever, with his ghost fork working potentially as effectively as Cruzâs forkball. The issue with Senga has been control, but he was more successful in a 6-man rotation environment, so maybe reduced innings in a bullpen role would help as well? Itâs tough because both Senga and Manaea are being paid to be starters for the Mets and yet I think the best way to squeeze value out of them at this point is placing them in a bullpen role, potentially with maybe Peterson too, which unfortunately leaves the Mets with just three real starting pitchers: McLean, Peralta, and Holmes.
Clay Holmes/Converting Relievers To Starters
The conversion of Clay Holmes from a reliever to a starter is a genuinely good piece of baseball alchemy and a success point in Stearnsâ tenure as Mets POBO. I wish the Mets were more aggressive in going after converted relievers, as theyâve actually had some real success in this area, and I hope that going forward, the Mets look more towards relievers to turn into starters rather than journeymen innings-eaters to turn into workhorse rotational anchors, which has had some really mixed results. Manaeaâs 2024 is really the only strength point, with a whole bunch of weak points - Griffin Canning, Frankie Montas, Luis Severino were all mid to Not Good as Mets. If I had to name names, Iâd look at someone like Jacob Latz on the Texas Rangers, who has terrific metrics and a solid arsenal of pitches to potentially transform into a starterâs mix.
Luis Robert Jr.
This trade was fine. I really donât have much more to say about this, but the Mets upgraded at center field without sacrificing much of anything or even paying much of anything. I think the Luis Robert Jr. trade was a decent trade and, even though it isnât particularly flashy at this point, represents good process amidst an offseason of bad process.
Juan Soto/Francisco Lindor
These guys are not getting traded, nor should they. This is the one bright spot that the Mets have outside of McLean - two superstars are locked up long-term in New York and theyâve been producing like it. Any discussion about trading either of these players is essentially an admission that the Mets wonât be good for a decade plus, which is obviously far too extreme of a rebuild when you have generational talent like this on your roster. I could talk about how good theyâve been and why we shouldnât trade them, but whatâs the point? The Mets arenât going to trade these guys, and if you look at the stats, itâs obvious that they shouldnât.
Bo Bichette
The Mets gave Bichette a boatload of money, which I think is bad process, but heâs probably going to be an MLB contributor next year for the Mets. I donât think he really fits the Mets current timeline, which in my eyes, has a contention window opening in 2028 (when we get off all of these bad contracts!), but heâs a good player, and itâs not a long-term deal that cripples the team financially. Iâm weirdly sort of ambivalent on evaluating Bichette. I think itâs too early to say that heâs a bust, but will he live him to the $42m committed to him this year? Probably not, because thatâs a crazy amount of money. Heâll be a good player that will produce far better than he is right now.
The one thing I would say thatâs sort of frustrating about Bichette is that he blocks Baty, a pre-arb guy, from playing third base, which is really the only way for Baty to accrue MLB starting caliber value. I am NOT saying Baty should be an everyday starter, Iâm just saying that signing someone like Bichette to play third base Literally Every Day kind of makes a defensive third baseman on a pre-arb contract redundant. I donât really understand why the Mets would commit so much money to Bichette and then NOT trade Baty. Thereâs no role for him on the field at this point outside of injury and Baty might actually be worth assets back as a pre-arb guy who did produce 2+ WAR a season ago.
The State Of The Mets
I mentioned this in an early paragraph, but from where Iâm standing, the Mets are in a quasi-rebuild at this point. I donât see a real contention window opening up for the Mets until 2028 unless Cohenâs money is literally infinite, because there is just so much bloat and bad roster construction surrounding this team that itâs going to take some sort of Flushing of the guard to come back with a roster thatâs able to contend. Iâll sort guys into tiers here to break down the situation for the Mets going forward, because in a rebuild, the focus should be on the future.
THE CORE: Productive Long-Term Staples w/ Guaranteed Salaries
OF Juan Soto: 27 y/o, signed through 2029 (Opt Out Option in â29) at 61m AAV
SS Francisco Lindor: 32 y/o, signed through 2031 at 34m AAV
EXTENSION CANDIDATES: Productive Youth
SP Nolan McLean: 24 y/o, arbitration through 2031 - PREARB
THE PROBLEM: Bad Contracts That Wonât Expire In 2026
1B/DH Jorge Polanco: 32 y/o, signed through 2027 at 20m AAV
âSPâ Sean Manaea: 34 y/o, signed through 2027 at 22m AAV
âSP Kodai Sengaâ: 33 y/o, signed through 2027 at 15m AAV (club option for â28)
QUESTION MARKS: Questionable Contracts That Could Be Good Or Bad
3B Bo Bichette: 28 y/o, signed through 2028 (Player Option in â27, â28) at 42m AAV
RP Devin Williams: 31 y/o, signed through 2028 at 15m AAV
RP Luke Weaver: 32 y/o, signed through 2027 at 11m AAV
EXPIRING/GRADUATING ARB STATUS
RP AJ Minter: 32 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 11m
OF Luis Robert Jr: 28 y/o, expires in 2027 (Club Option) - 20m
SP Freddy Peralta: 29 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 8m
RP Craig Kimbrel: 37 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 2m
RP Brooks Raley: 37 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 5m
OF Austin Slater: 33 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 1m
SP David Peterson: 30 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 8m
OF Tyrone Taylor: 32 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 4m
C Luis Torrens: 30 y/o, free agent in 2027 - 2m
PREARB/ARBITRATION CONTROL
P Tylor Megill: 30 y/o, arbitration through 2027 - 2.5m
C MJ Melendez: 27 y/o, arbitration through 2028 - 1.5m
C Francisco Alvarez: 24 y/o, arbitration through 2029 - 2.5m
RP Reed Garrett: 33 y/o, arbitration through 2029 - 1.3m
RP Huascar Brazoban: 36 y/o, arbitration through 2029 - 1m
3B/DH Mark Vientos: 26 y/o, arbitration through 2029 - PREARB
3B/RF/??? Brett Baty: 26 y/o, arbitration through 2029 - PREARB
SP/RP Tobias Myers: 27 y/o, arbitration through 2030 - PREARB
1B/DH Jared Young: 30 y/o, arbitration through 2031 - PREARB
OF Carson Benge: 23 y/o, arbitration through 2031 - PREARB
The point of this section is to illustrate the state of the Mets payroll, and to identify some hope for optimism. In 2027, the Mets will free up $22.5m from the dead contracts of Frankie Montas, Tommy Pham, Luis Garcia, Ben Rortvedt, and Vidal Brujan, as well as ~7m from paying off the money owed to the Athletics/Rangers in the McNeil/Nimmo trades. Additionally, assuming the Mets donât extend any of the players set to hit free agency in 2027, the Mets will free up an additional $61m. This means that, assuming the Mets truly go scorched earth and want to rebuild the roster from the ground up, theyâll have $90.5m AAV to work with in free agency and for extensions if Steve Cohen is willing to continue running payroll at this level. Tarik Skubal is a free agent this offseason and is the type of guy you throw a lot of money at, Nolan McLean needs an extension as soon as the Mets can get one done, and there are always players on expiring contracts that deserve extensions who the Mets could go after. Going to 2028, the year I see the Mets being able to contend, theyâll free up $70.5m off of the contracts of Luke Weaver, Tylor Megill, Jorge Polanco, Sean Manaea, and Kodai Senga being set to expire.
In short, over the course of the next few years, the Mets are going to free up a lot of the money that theyâve spent on bad contract extensions and bad contract signings, as well as money theyâve used in trades, on arbitration players, and for players no longer on the team. The Mets will, assuming that theyâre willing to continue running a payroll this high (which they should be during a 2028 contention window), have somewhere around $161m AAV to spend on free agents and contract extensions.
2028 could look like:
> $161m AAV freed in cap
> Soto, Lindor, Bichette still signed+productive
> Francisco Alvarez/MJ Melendez at catcher, both on arbitration deals still
> Devin Williams still signed
> McLean extended?
> Tong, Wenninger, Scott up to MLB level as pitching prospects
> Reimer, Serrano, Ewing, Clifford up to MLB level as hitting prospects (with a long shot for Asigen and Pena as well, depending on how quickly they progress through the minors)
> Baty, Vientos, Mauricio either in productive roles or traded for something of value
That is a spot you can build a contender from. The issue isnât this inflection point in 2028, the issue is getting there. Time and time again the Mets have sabotaged the potential opening of a contention window with bad deals and bad extensions. If the Mets are going to find a way back to the promised land, theyâre going to have to find a way to improve the flawed process that put them in this hole.